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This essay explores the challenge that soft decertification poses for feminist politics. In soft 
decertification, people continue to have a formal legal sex/ gender status; however, public and 
other bodies act as if such status was no longer determinative (at least in certain contexts). As 
glimpses of soft decertification emerge, what are its implications for gender equality initiatives 
hitherto focused on addressing the asymmetrically patterned lives of women and men? What new 
ways of understanding gender are coming to the fore, and what challenges arise for bodies 
engaged in equality governance in trying to address them? This essay explores these questions 
through the prism of responsibility - the ethical, political, and legal obligation to pay attention or 
respond that different bodies have because of their capacity to undo or ameliorate social 
inequalities and other injustices. Specifically, it asks: What does responsibility for gender entail 
when gender is treated as both institutionalised and self-determined; public and private? The 
essay addresses two contexts where equality governance approaches gender as a site of 
institutional re-making and redress. The first concerns the front-stage initiatives and policies of 
public sector provision; the second concerns the back-stage scenes of organisational action, 
where informal decision-making arises. In both cases, taking responsibility for gender, as an 
institution, is far from straight-forward. This essay explores the importance of doing so - not just 
despite, but because of, the complex conditions responsibility confronts when institutional forms 
also exist as individual attachments.  
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In the global north, understandings of gender are shifting as the unquestioned assumption of two 
natural sex-based groupings is shaken. In Britain, the prevailing view still seems to lean towards 
perceiving gender as binary and relatively stable (see Peel and Newman, this issue). However, 
momentum is building for an account of gender as personal, self-determined, and plural (e.g., 
Cannoot and Decoster 2020).1  Proponents and many commentators view this understanding of 
gender as progressive. However, it has encountered criticism on different grounds. Sex-based 
rights feminists argue that it diminishes the significance of biological sex – which they deem a 
stable feature of life and at the heart of women’s oppression (see Jeffreys 2014; Sullivan 2020). 
Others object to the decentring of gender’s systemic or structural character, which arises in 
moves to depict gender as individually authored or possessed (see Venditti 2020; more generally, 
Walby 2007).   
Competing accounts of gender as identity-based, sex-derived, and  structural have faced 
each other in different fora and decision-making processes, including admissions policies for 
women’s refuges, transgender policies in schools, admittance to women-only parliamentary 
shortlists, census questions and guidance, toilet signage, prison allocation procedures, women’s 
sports, university ‘no platform’ decisions, and employer policies on acceptable speech.2 One site 
where disagreement has arisen concerns the cluster of proposals currently emerging to de-
register, de-classify or decertify sex/ gender (e.g., see Cruz 2002; Cooper and Renz 2016; Quinan 
et al. 2020).3  Our focus in this Special Issue is the last: decertification – where the state (and 
state law) withdraws from registering, assigning, or confirming an individual’s sex/ gender 
status. As Robyn Emerton and I discuss (this issue), different versions of decertification exist. 
                                                          
1 See also https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2020/07/16/where-does-british-public-stand-
transgender-rights; last accessed 17 August 2020. 
2 For arguments on different sides, see Hines 2020; Jeffreys 2014; Murray and Blackburn 2019; Pearce et al. 2020; 
for further discussion and sources, see other articles in this Special Issue.  
3 Whether and how to use the language of gender, sex, or sex/ gender is a source of considerable dispute. In this 
article, I use gender to foreground the social manifestation and production of differences organised in tighter or 
looser fashion around the social relations and categories of male/ female, masculine/ feminine, recognising these 
terms continue to have salience for gender categories and politics that reject their binarism. In the analysis here, 
gender encompasses and constitutes sex as socially meaningful. This does not mean that sex refers only to ideational 
processes. Both gender and sex are materially (including bio-socially) generated and enacted in ways shaped by 
spatial, economic, and techno-historical processes among others. I use sex/ gender in those instances where either or 
both terms apply or where I want to indicate disagreement over which term is applicable.  







The version we address in this Special Issue does not remove sex/ gender from state purview as a 
matter of equality and social justice concern. However, its implementation would mean people 
no longer have a formal sex/ gender status – placing gender on a par with sexuality or ethnicity, 
organising  principles of inequality that state law recognises for remedial purposes without 
people being formally assigned to a category.  
The proposal to decertify sex/ gender seems, at first glance, to align with an 
understanding of gender as identity-based.4 Termination of the currently standard process of 
registering sex at birth supports, it would seem, a process in which individuals choose (or come 
to know) their own identity on their own terms (see also Jenkins 2018). Indeed, one justification 
for decertification is that if sex and gender become (recognised as) self-authorised 
identifications, they no longer have a necessary or sensible relationship to formal legal status. 
This has led some feminists to criticise both gender self-identification and decertification (see 
Cooper and Emerton, this issue). Yet, decertification can be tied to more social (or structural) 
critiques of gender. Decertification is a legal technique of withdrawal that may help to diminish 
gender’s organising power. While the effects of decertification can only be speculated upon, it 
appears to support gender’s undoing as a formative aspect of society in several significant ways. 
Decertification would enable people to live without an official sex/ gender status; it would 
disrupt the confident allocation of people to categories, which gender as a hierarchical ordering 
process relies upon; and perhaps most provisionally, it might disturb the normalisation of sex/ 
gender as something that belongs to individuals. In these different ways then, decertification 
could withdraw a taken-for-granted legal bolster holding our current sex/ gender system in place.  
At the same time, and in many respects, decertification is a modest act, one unlikely by 
itself to significantly transform how sex/ gender is socially organised. In discussing 
decertification with critics, as part of our ESRC project, The Future of Legal Gender,5 several 
people commented that decertification would be ineffectual, premature, and utopianly unviable. 
One union official remarked when interviewed,  
                                                          
4 The focus on self-authoring or self-identifying one’s gender also aligns with a gender-as-diversity approach (see 
Cooper 2019a).  
5 https://futureoflegalgender.kcl.ac.uk/ 






“I can see the government thinking, this is an easy way for us to say that we are addressing 
sex discrimination and gender inequality. We will just say that sex doesn't exist anymore. 
… And then, because sex doesn't exist, sexism doesn't exist. I don't know how that helps 
women.”  
A council officer made a similar point:  
“It makes certain things invisible, doesn't it? I know that some people would say that that 
will help to tackle sexual harassment. If everybody socialises in the same way, that will 
help undermine this whole basis on which men [are] socialise[d] in a different way to 
women. I agree with that. At the same time, I think that it's not going to die out overnight, 
is it? We still live in a very patriarchal, you know; just not [having] designated legal 
gender, it's not going to like do away with the whole patriarchal society that we live in.” 
Yet, decertification in Britain may already be informally underway – at least in some respects. In 
this “soft” version of decertification, public and other bodies act as if a sex/ gender status 
assigned or confirmed by the state is no longer determinative. Instead, greater recognition and 
authorial power is given to individuals to determine their own sex/ gender identity. In this 
version of decertification, certain potential features are less pronounced (or present). For 
instance, as I discuss below, people are assumed to have a sex/ gender, which public (and other) 
bodies should recognise and respond to. Thus, there is little evidence of moves to abandon or 
abolish sex/ gender as a classificatory structure among public bodies. At the same time, growing 
recognition of new, emerging sex/ gender categories, and the growing tendency to make 
individuals the privileged site of identification and authorisation, beg questions about the 
enduring pertinence of sex/ gender for public policymaking and law.  
The development of informal decertification is a source of celebration for some and 
dismay for others. In this essay, I reflect on its implications for gender politics, particularly for a 
politics intent on countering the institutional inequalities that gender (as a formation which 
includes sex) continues to express and produce. These politics can be, and are, framed in 
different ways, including as a politics of inclusion, recognition, redistribution, empowerment, 
and protection. Here, I focus on two political agendas: to remake gender as diverse, inclusive, 







and self-directed; and to undo gender as an asymmetrical structural force (begging the critical 
question of whether gender could ever become anything else). The question that this essay poses 
is whether and how these different political projects might cohere. Their collision is very 
publicly evident as I explore. But can a politics oriented to gender as a feature of personhood 
(one increasingly described as rightly private) also attend to gender as a forceful, asymmetric 
social patterning? I want to explore this issue in two ways. First, I consider gender as a public 
matter, and the different ways such publicness is understood. Of special concern here is gender’s 
institutional dimensions, by which I mean the socially patterned and unequal rules, roles, norms, 
processes, spaces, and activities taken to comprise it (see Martin 2004). Second, I consider two 
settings where gender’s current institutional form has been challenged; both involve public 
organisations where decertification’s de facto operationalisation is emerging and so glimpsed. 
Certainly, some grass-roots communities also approach gender as a diverse, self-identified, 
personal feature of human subjects that is outside any state determination; however, I am 
interested in public bodies’ actions because proposals to decertify gender foreground formal 
change at the state level. As a political proposal, decertification can appear as a unitary claim – it 
either exists, having been introduced by states (and state law), or it does not. This essay focuses 
on an intermediate space in which decertification is present as soft law or policy that is also 
uneven in its presence and contested. In such conditions, I want to consider what it means to take 
responsibility for gender’s asymmetric institutional patterning as something to remake or, 
alternatively, to unmake. Thus, the essay does not focus on establishing the normative argument 
that bodies should take responsibility for gender, but rather considers what such responsibility 
could mean and the challenges it confronts. 
Responsibility is often tied to the culpability that a subject has for harms caused; other 
times it constitutes a duty to maintain what is. My interest here is in the responsibility that comes 
from a capacity to make a difference in ways oriented to transforming gender, and specifically to 
undoing the inequalities it gives rise to and expresses. Today, different bodies – state and non-
state, collective and individual – take responsibility for changing how gender is patterned. While 
for grass-roots activists and communities, this responsibility is usually deemed voluntary (and so 
a matter of morality, ethics, or politics), my focus is on bodies with statutory, functional, or 
formal responsibilities. Specifically, I consider the equality governance sector – a loose network 






of bodies whose policies and practices have been important in developing and institutionalising 
progressive-liberal equality norms. My first setting concerns equality approaches in British local 
government and specialist equality bodies, drawing on interview data from a subset of fifteen 
semi-structured conversations.6  These were conducted with officials and other equality staff, 
purposively sampled for their organisations’ proactive approach in engaging with critical and 
changing understandings of gender-based inequalities and exclusions. My analysis explores the 
tensions these bodies have faced in responding to competing gender agendas, and the approaches 
that get organised out from such public state projects. But exercising responsibility for doing 
gender differently is not just about public bodies’ front-stage – often modest or cautious – 
actions. Critical accounts routinely assume a clear line between public bodies, on the one hand, 
and grass-roots activist networks, on the other (as I have explored in more detail elsewhere, see 
Cooper 2016, 2019b). Yet, the reality is that these distinctions are often blurred, unstable, and 
partial (Newman 2012). Informal actions, shaped by wider activist politics, can be undertaken 
within public bodies, drawing on the opportunities, authority, and resources that are 
institutionally available. These actions may be dismissed as ad hoc, improvised, and unintended; 
however, progress within (and by) public bodies sometimes happens because of unplanned and 
unofficial action or decisions that exceed what was expected to take place.7  
In the final part of this essay, I consider how organisational staff may informally seek to 
exercise responsibility for gender’s symbolic inequalities and alignments. My discussion draws 
on a fictionalised micro-scenario based on a personal experience a few years back: of an 
interview panel with three women and one man (or so it seemed), where the question was posed 
of who should chair, and whether it should be a woman. The experience, and particularly the 
awkward uncertainty surrounding the ‘naming’ of gendered subjects in the room, places some of 
the challenges of pursuing feminist politics – in conditions of gender’s growing privatisation – in 
sharp relief.  What it also reveals is the entanglement that minor, seemingly trivial, gender-based 
                                                          
6 These interviews formed a small sub-set of over 100 interviews carried out as part of the ESRC project on The 
Future of Legal Gender. Other interviews were conducted with trade union officials, feminist and transgender 
organisations, women’s refuges and other shelters, the sports sector, the adult care field, central government, 
lawyers and legal drafters, school managers and educators, representatives of religious organisations, academics, and 
wider publics.  
7 I have explored this further in Cooper 1994; 1998. 







dilemmas can generate as personal identifications and attachments get tangled with socio-
political interventions. Can gendered statuses be named or is this to make improper assumptions 
about what people are? Do people carry gendered meanings beyond those they intend to express? 
And how can these be addressed? One challenge is how to understand and engage with the 
social/ personal “knots” which contribute to (and often drive) public and legal discourse when it 
comes to gender and other relations of inequality. My example concerns one micro-scaled 
interaction; however, political symbolism, representation, gendered styles of practice, and good 
optics routinely emerge at larger scales in relation to affirmative action initiatives, such as 
women-only parliamentary shortlists (discussed in Cooper and Emerton, this issue).  To explore 
how responsibility for redoing gender is taken up and challenged in this interview panel 
example, I draw on the dramaturgical concept of the “scene” (see also Edelman 1985; Hajer 
2005). Scenes, such as this one, confront the complexity of gender as socially patterned, 
increasingly de-standardised, personally invested in, and subject to competing frames of 
intelligibility around what gender is, means, and does. As such, it also confronts the challenge of 
sustaining a critically attentive relationship to gender where no option or way forward seems 
fully satisfactory given what else is at stake.  
 
Gender as private identity 
Accounts of gender as self-determined (or self-identified) routinely treat gender as something 
that is, and should be respected as, “deeply personal” (Davis 2014: 48).8 As one set of British 
guidelines for transgender children in schools states, “Gender – the way that a person feels about 
themselves in relation to their physical and mental self; the basis of their identifying as male, or 
female, or neither, or either, both” (sic).9 In their response to the Scottish Government’s review 
of the Gender Recognition Act 2004, Stonewall Scotland wrote: “someone’s gender identity is 
inherently private and individual, and should not be subject to another’s approval”.10 Legal 
scholar Lena Holzer (2018: 10-11) also describes how gender has become “a private issue” for 
                                                          
8 For different ways of approaching this, see also Katyal 2017; Paechter 2006; Quinan and Bresser 2020: 7. 
9 https://www.cornwall.gov.uk/media/13620644/schools-transgender_guidance_booklet-2015.pdf, p. 16: last 
accessed 17 August 2020. 
10 https://www2.gov.scot/Resource/0053/00539455.pdf; last accessed 2 September 2020.  






some, quoting fellow legal academics Marjolein van den Brink and Jet Tigchelaar who suggest 
that gender should be identified “as a sensitive personal identity marker” (2015: 40).   
The notion of gender as personal or private dovetails with a gender-as-identity approach. 
But what does it mean to describe gender in this way? Discourses of privacy, in other contexts, 
signal seclusion. Seyla Benhabib (1993: 106), discussing Arendt (1958), locates it in aspects of 
the “‘domestic-intimate’ sphere” that are “hidden from the glare of the public eye”. Private can 
identify a space – of dwelling and domesticity, or a zone of non-intrusion; it can identify an 
individual relationship of property or belonging,11 a lack, or something that is non-political, un-
staged, intimate, and unaccountable. Not all these meanings of privacy come into play in relation 
to the political expression and development of gender-as-identity. Instead, here, a cluster of 
meanings assemble around self-realisation, voluntary disclosure, comfort, and intimacy (see also 
Cannoot and Decoster 2020). This cluster mirrors a similar constellation of meanings, norms, 
and practices that cohered in late twentieth century liberal discourses on homosexuality, also 
around the terms of privacy. Homosexuality became depicted as intimate, personal, self-realised, 
and entitled to protection - to insulate it from conservative attack as well as from a more radical 
and expansive politics of gay liberation and political lesbianism. In relation to both gender and 
sexuality, privacy validates norms of protection and formal equality rights, rationalised by the 
value (or inevitable presence) of gender and sexual orientation as necessary features of self-
growth and self-expression.  
Claims to privacy can be important; however, as a political account of gender (as well as 
of sexuality) it has its limits. For the discussion that follows, two stand out. First, discourses of 
privacy locate gender within individual subjects, as something which belongs to subjects in 
intimate, proprietary, responsible ways, rather than to society. Valeria Venditti (2020: 69) writes, 
“gender identity sanctions the autarchy of the subject. The very concept of ‘self-determination’ 
rules out of the legal sphere the relational aspects of gender. The sovereign rhetoric deployed in 
the law clashes with the hurdles that arise in the social unfolding of gender.” In other words, 
privacy as self-determination risks treating the subject as the author of their own gender; a 
                                                          
11 Feminist scholarship has explored the relationship between gender, property, and possession in different ways; see 
for instance, Butler and Athanasiou 2013; Davies 1994; Katyal 2017; Nedelsky 1990; see also Cooper and Renz 
2016. 







gender that is unshaped by other forces, including other gender norms and practices. Second, 
discourses of privacy trouble and tend to delegitimate the place of critical engagement when it 
comes to questioning the values underpinning gendered norms, practices, and forms, or in 
reimagining what gender could become. These two problems shape the discussion that follows, 
which focuses on gender’s “public” life – a concept I use expansively to explore the unequal, 
socially patterned, staged, and shared ways that gender operates. My discussion foregrounds the 
institutional character of this life, but it is not only in these accounts that gender’s public 
dimensions appear. 
 
Gender in public 
Despite the growing pervasiveness of norms that treat gender as a private dimension of 
personhood, gender’s presence within British public discourse is unquestionable. Today, in 
Britain, gender is discussed and argued over in ways that seem quite remarkable given prevailing 
understandings of gender only a few years ago. Feminist, transgender, and non-binary 
perspectives have quickly become part of public and media discourse;12 employers incorporate 
(or are urged to incorporate) new gender categories;13 and concerns over anti-trans sentiment and 
transphobic behaviour more generally have raised public awareness of the normative pressures of 
gender conformity and transgression’s costs.14  Much of the recent public focus on trans and 
non-conforming gender identifications foregrounds the importance of being “seen” and validated 
by the state (or by employers and service providers) as recognition becomes a pathway to dignity 
and respect.15 Recognition is also advocated for material reasons where its absence causes some 
                                                          
12 E.g., see Arwa Mahdawi, “He, she, they … should we now clarify our preferred pronouns when we say hello?”, 
The Guardian 13 September 2019: https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2019/sep/13/pronouns-gender-he-she-
they-natalie-wynn-contrapoints; last accessed 3 September 2020. 
13 E.g., see for instance, https://www.essex.ac.uk/-/media/documents/directories/human-resources/supporting-trans-
non-binary-staff.pdf and  https://www.personneltoday.com/hr/gender-identity-pronouns/; last accessed 3 September 
2020. 
14 E.g., see Hackney Council Inclusive Language Guide: https://hackney.gov.uk/equality-diversity; last accessed 3 
September 2020.  
15 See Christie Elan-Cane, evidence to the Women and Equalities Committee, Transgender Equality Inquiry, 13 
October 2015, HC 390, p. 32: 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-
committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf; last accessed 25 February 2019; also James Morton, evidence to the 
Women and Equalities Committee, Transgender Equality Inquiry, 13 October 2015, HC 390, p. 13: 






identities, and sometimes also some bodies, to be excluded or erased from spaces, services, and 
activities (see Ryan 2018; Spade 2015).  
In his discussion of transgender politics, Paddy McQueen (2015: 121) takes up Cillian 
McBride’s notion of a “deficit model” of recognition, in which the problem is unevenly 
distributed resources of acknowledgment and address, such that some have very little or none. 
Yet, while gaining “proper” or adequate recognition has proven an important dimension of 
contemporary gender activism, the concept of public also signals other kinds of politics, 
including those organised around interpersonal relations and action within everyday life.16 Here, 
new gender meanings are asserted, inhabited, and developed, as actors (deliberately or 
otherwise) challenge conventional gender norms, including those of gender intelligibility (e.g., 
see Nordmarken 2014). Also posed, as well as troubled, in the process is the connection between 
gendered forms of public appearance, and personal identification or feeling. For the most part, 
public expression of gender diversity is advocated (and justified) on the grounds it reflects an 
inner gender. Since this gender is a core aspect of someone’s personhood, they have the moral 
(and so should have the legal) right to express it freely and safely within the public sphere. 
Gender-as-identity approaches, such as the international human rights Yogyakarta Principles, 
recognise that gender identity and expression may not converge;17 and people should not have to 
give shape to their inner gender in any specific way. However, both should be protected (see also 
Butler 2015: 61). Public gender expression forms a part of personhood even if it does not 
coincide with someone’s gender identity.  
Elsewhere, I have explored some of the difficulties in identifying, in non-stereotypical 
ways, what gender means in this approach (see Cooper 2019a). But what interests me here is the 
relationship between gender identity and expression, on the one hand, and an institutional 
account of gender, on the other. If gender is a legitimate terrain of political engagement, where 
                                                          
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-
committee/transgender-equality/oral/23159.pdf; last accessed 25 February 2019.  
16 There is an interesting resonance here with Arendtian perspectives on the public realm, which focus on the 
courageous creation of new meanings, practices, and relations through action in front of and with others; see also 
Butler 2015; Dossa 1989; Honig 1995. 
17 The Yogyakarta Principles plus 10, adopted 10 November 2017, Geneva: http://yogyakartaprinciples.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/A5_yogyakartaWEB-2.pdf, p. 6; last accessed 30 August 2020.  







do gendered subjects and personal gendered investments fit? Liberal approaches treat gendered 
subjects (particularly adults, but not only adults) as the agents of action and the holders of rights, 
as they also treat them as the source of their own gender identity and meaning. Yet, if we 
typically communicate more and other than we intend, what does this mean for gender? Gender 
critical feminists, who treat sex as immutable, suggest “male bodied” persons express male 
power regardless of how they identify.18 I do not pursue that argument here; at the same time, I 
am reluctant to treat gender – as currently understood and manifested (that is along its current 
conceptual lines) – as something that exclusively belongs to, and is controlled by, the gendered 
subject, given the complex factors that shape how gendered subjects and practices emerge, are 
enacted and read, and the complex factors that shape what follows. If gender exceeds our own 
personal projects of identification – or the social-cultural-psychic maps that normatively orient 
us even when we repudiate their terms (see also Jenkins 2016, 2018), if gender is a social 
process, fundamentally, rather than a personal trait, how gender is made becomes important. 
Such scenes of making exceed subjects’ gender identifications but, in the sites that I discuss, they 
simultaneously are compelled to engage with them.   
  The discussion that follows explores the relationship between social inequality and 
individual identity through the register of responsibility. When gender is primarily understood as 
a private attachment, public responsibility takes a specific form: namely to protect and empower 
people’s gender-property so subjects can express their gender as freely and fully as possible. 
Much contemporary activism around gender aligns with this approach. But if responsibility for 
gender aims to counter gender’s socially pervasive and asymmetrically patterned character – its 
capacity to structure and shape state apparatuses, social divisions, norms, and epistemologies as 
well as people’s activities, assumed roles, desires, and interests – how should we account for this 
gender? Over many decades, feminist theory has drawn on different conceptual frameworks and 
figures to encapsulate gender’s form, from axes, systems, regimes, and organising principles to 
performances, language, grammar, doings, and discourses. Across and within these approaches 
(since they give rise to multiple versions), different cuts and joins in how gender is imagined, 
                                                          
18 For one elaboration of gender critical views, see Forstater v. CGT Europe and Others ET 2019, Case Number 
2200909/2019. 






actualised, and in the movement between the two come into play. Here, I focus on gender’s 
institutional dimensions – as one register of publicness that treats gender as a social patterning 
with force. Institutional thinking has its limitations. But what is useful about it, in this context, is 
its emphasis on durability, inequalities of power, and the ways in which different social features 
cohere to form something forceful and meaningful. These qualities provide the impetus for 
taking responsibility, as I go on to discuss. 
 
Gender’s institutional dimensions 
A tremendous body of feminist work, too extensive to enumerate, has detailed and analysed 
gender’s durability and significance within social life: how gender shapes people’s desires, 
behaviour, and choices; relations of violence, exploitation and discrimination; and the 
development of social institutions, from schools, economy, and law to the very notion of public 
and private domains. One useful strand of feminist work explores how gender shapes (and is 
embedded within) other institutions, including those of government (e.g., Chappell 2006; 
Lowndes 2020). While I am concerned in this essay with a governmental exercise of 
responsibility in relation to gender, I also want to consider the institutional qualities of gender 
itself. Patricia Martin (2004) helpfully sets out twelve institutional dimensions, which she argues 
gender shares (see also Lorber 2000; Risman 2004). These include social practices that persist 
across space and time, specific roles, procedures, rules, norms, social expectations, embodied 
agents, tangible things, and self-legitimating ideologies. Thus, we might consider gendered 
practices of empathy and violence; parents’ and workers’ roles; the procedures and rules in place 
for establishing and changing one’s legal gender status; how gender imbues life-course 
expectations, bodily movement, and care-work; the gendering of clothes, toys, novels, and 
dance; and ideologies that depict gender differences as natural, elective, or something else.  
In exploring gender’s institutional character in Britain, it is important to recognise the 
parts that other social relations and processes play, including race and class (e.g., see Anthias 
2008; Crenshaw 1989; Grabham et al. 2008; Walby et al. 2012). It is also important to recognise 
gender’s institutional inconsistencies; how gender can take multiple forms; shifts and blurs; and 
is challenged and remade by different kinds of social agency (see also Connell 1987; Risman 







2018: 36). These elements of multiplicity and contingency, shot through with inequalities of 
power, are foregrounded within critical institutional writing (see Cleaver and de Koning 2015), 
which also emphasises the place of “bricolage”: as “people, consciously and non-consciously, 
assemble or reshape institutional arrangements, drawing on whatever materials and resources are 
available, regardless of their original purpose” (Cleaver and de Koning 2015).  At the same time, 
central to an institutional approach are the linkages (if not necessarily inevitable linkages) 
between different aspects of gender’s patterning. Much feminist work focuses on these, since it is 
the arrangements and connections between bodies, resources, experiences, statuses, options, and 
power – in all their inequalities – which make gender critically intelligible (see also Markovits 
and Bickford 2014).  
Gender’s intelligibility, however, does not take a common unitary form. Current struggles 
over the authenticity of self-identification reveal the heightened levels of disagreement that exist 
regarding gender’s institutional character, particularly its key statuses, relations, and harms. 
While different perspectives exist, two have come to dominate public debate. One “side” focuses 
on the privileged status of “cis” gender,19 and the harms caused to those who cannot or choose 
not to conform to a stable, dualist framework; the other “side” focuses on the gender-
subordinated status of women, and the harms that make up this subordination (see Peel and 
Newman, this issue; also Cooper 2019a; Pearce et al. 2020). These diverging accounts draw on, 
and give shape to, different cuts and joins in gender’s material life, as they also, in turn, act upon 
it. Nevertheless, despite these differences, and the changes in gender’s institutional form which I 
turn to shortly, recognising that gender has a patterned life that is forceful and un-equalising is 
crucial if gender is to be treated as having the necessary durability, systematicity, and social 
force to matter, and so give rise to relations of responsibility. In the absence of such patterning, 
gender loses its critical salience as a contemporary socio-political category.  
 
  
                                                          
19 The term “cis” is used to identify people whose gender (or sex) is assumed not to have changed from the way they 
were classified at birth. 






Responsibility for gender  
Responsibility is often approached, particularly in legal contexts, as a set of obligations activated 
through retrospective lines of causation. In other words, responsibility arises from tracking what 
a body has caused or, at least, has benefited from. Critical theorists have complicated and 
collectivised this account of responsibility (e.g., Young 2006). However, past-facing questions of 
causation and culpability are not my concern here. Since gender is ongoing, contemporary, and 
ubiquitous, a more useful way of framing responsibility, for my purposes, focuses on the 
responsibilities that flow from different bodies’ capacities, given the power they exercise, to 
respond to social arrangements that are hazardous, normalising, and animating, that have been 
inherited, and that continue to act (see also Cooper and Herman 2020). But if responsibility 
comes from an ability to make a difference, what does responsibility for gender entail? 
Responsibility is often associated with maintenance – keeping something in good 
working order. In this sense, responsibility may be vigorously mobilised to re-discipline and 
order gender, as a “complementary” and hierarchical relationship, as the Christian Right has long 
attempted. For social conservatives, more generally, responsibility for gender as an institution is 
to keep it up and to assign responsibility for its upkeep. But responsibility for gender can work in 
other ways. Many have written about the work and attention people put into their own gender-
performances, as they assume responsibility for personal gender maintenance in conditions 
where failure or breakdown may cause other bodies – formally or informally – to intervene (see 
Bartky 1988; West and Zimmerman 1987; Wilchins 1997). However, maintenance-oriented 
responsibilities are not the kinds of responsibilities I want to consider. In their contributions to 
this Special Issue, both Sumi Madhok and Vanessa Munro helpfully draw attention to 
responsibility’s risks, when it works to individualise or disempower, and so reinforces existing 
inequalities and geopolitical relations of control. With their hesitations in mind, I want to 
consider an outward-facing responsibility for remaking and unmaking gender. In doing so, I 
focus on the challenges, and sometimes tensions, that have arisen for governance bodies 
navigating feminist concerns about gender’s imposed asymmetric force alongside newly 
emerging concerns that self-identified gender claims be acknowledged and respected. The 
encounters (and sometimes confrontations) between different political agendas take shape in 







organised equality governance policies, initiatives, and provision, as well as in organisational 
scenes of micro-action. While the first foregrounds official, front-stage enactments, the second 
attends to what is undertaken backstage, when organisational workers deploy the resources, 
roles, and spaces they occupy for supplementary ends.  
Equality governance has long approached gender as an institutional problem of barriers 
and brakes necessitating reforms to remedy unfair rules and norms, and empowerment strategies 
for those subordinated by them. These responses to the problems that gender poses were also 
identified in interviews, conducted as part of the project on the Future of Legal Gender, with 
those holding an organisational equality brief. Interviewees described the need for:    
“measures [] to try and help natal women overcome disadvantage that's linked to their 
reproductive functions. For example, a lot of problems in employment can be linked to 
pregnancy and maternity discrimination… [There’s also] the long-term disadvantages 
suffered over the lifetime of a woman’s working career, because of disruption and things 
like that.” 
“What we are trying to do is identify the barriers that you might experience as a student 
and as an employee because of your gender.”  
“Let's say, think about education. You are thinking about the curriculum, is it relatable to 
girls, as well as boys?  Thinking about achievement between girls and boys, and what is 
holding girls back or what's holding boys back.”  
“It is about empowerment, I think, isn’t it? And it’s about … I use the word, equality.  It’s 
about having protected characteristics and having some sort of disadvantage or prejudice or 
reasons why you are not able … you are not on an equal playing field with your neighbour 
and trying to overcome those issues so that it's, you know, fairness and the rest of it.”  
Long-standing concerns with the unequal social field that women, particularly, have faced, have 
been accompanied more recently, and in some cases confronted, by a different set of concerns. 
Gender here is less a name for asymmetric disadvantage and barriers than a descriptor of needs 






and interests. Several interviewees described the institutional changes needed and being 
undertaken to recognise different kinds of gendered subjectivity.  
“Post-Equality Act [2010], they were really keen for us to start collecting … data.  We ask 
whether people are male or female, whether they are non-binary … And that would 
generally be used as a starting point for service needs and specific questions as well.”  
“I do think that it’s useful to name the groups that we work with, so pregnant women, 
pregnant trans men, pregnant non-binary people, they have very different experiences and 
different needs.”   
Approaching gender as an institution with multiple subject-positions, equality governance 
interviewees stressed problems of exclusion and erasure.  
“If you are not identifying as either [male or female] then you are being made to make a 
fixed choice, which cuts at the heart of who you are as a person. … Will you not receive a 
service because you are non-binary?  No, you won’t not receive a service, but in order to 
receive that service, in some instances, you are receiving it as a man or a woman.”  
“So, when we did the trans needs assessment… non-binary came out as quite a large 
proportion of that... There was quite a number of issues. And one of the things that came 
out was the Mx honorific… Again, it's this thing about labels actually being, in some 
regards really, really significant for people. If I can't tick the right box on the form for my 
honorific, for my gender, then I don't exist.”  
Recognition for other gender identifications was described as essential, even as it challenged the 
conventionally established ways that governmental organisations responded to (and enacted) 
gender.  
“If we didn’t say non-binary, there would be a whole load of people in the city that don’t 
exist. Literally don’t exist.  We are trying to be explicit because we want non-binary people 
to come and join the council perhaps in recruitment, or we want to make sure that they are 
recognised. So, wherever we have got – it’s more about recognising a community that’s 
there.”  







Moves by equality governance staff to enact norms, rules, and forms of address in line with a 
self-determined account of gender demonstrate a soft form of decertification. While people 
continue to bear a formal legal sex/ gender status, this status was treated as non-determinative (or 
less relevant) in a range of circumstances, where self-identification was considered more salient. 
This move to self-identified gender, however, did not go uncontested. One significant challenge 
came from advocates of women’s sex-based rights, concerned with women’s sex-based 
vulnerability, and their need for protection from violence, harassment, sexual intrusion, and male 
dominance (see also Peel and Newman, Munro, this issue). There is a long critical history 
regarding the place of vulnerability and protection within feminist politics – not least because of 
its socioeconomic, racialised, and sexualised implications (e.g., see Hunt 1990). However, 
discourses of vulnerability rose to prominence within public feminist discourse in the late 2010s 
in the course of opposing legal reforms to relax how gender categories and the movement 
between them were to be regulated. Demands to retain sex-specific provision, based on narrowly 
defined notions of who constituted a woman, provided a strategic claim and, also, a goal within 
the struggle over gender’s classificatory terms (see also Bailey 2008: 579).  
 Equality governance actors, we interviewed, described the political pressures within their 
sector to respond to activist demands that the distinct legal status of sex be given proper 
recognition.  
“We have had challenges – we had a challenge about the fact that in some areas of our …  
in some of our wording, we use “gender” rather than “sex” or “sex and gender”. We 
thought, okay, actually, that is a fair challenge, because the protected characteristic in the 
Equality Act is “sex”.  If you are listing it, you put sex; that’s fine. In some of our internal 
documents we actually expand, and we explain what we mean, or we put “sex/ gender”. 
We just think that’s fine.”    
“We do use – would prefer to use gender because it’s a broader term. You’ve also got to 
consider the issues of non-binary and things like this.  But, under pressure, and in 
recognition that the legal term is actually sex…Our response is, we will use “sex” when it 
is specifically about the protected characteristics.  But at all other times, we would prefer to 
use “gender” when we are talking more generally.”  






In this way, equality governance became a site where disagreement between gender projects got 
played out: as one project coded public responsibility in terms of inclusion and recognition; and 
another focused on public bodies’ responsibility to undo the harms and injustices faced by 
women as a sex.  Yet, in this ongoing dispute over the use of sex and gender as categorical terms, 
what can get overlooked is the common ground between the two positions. One part of this 
common ground was their shared emphasis on social subjects – whether as the site of sex or of 
gender. Focusing on subjects is, of course, important.  It recognises that gender’s harms and 
injuries (including those associated with sex) are felt by people. It also recognises that 
organisational attempts at reform are carried out by sexed and gendered individuals who bring 
their own experiences, histories, and politics to the process. But one risk in foregrounding 
subjects is that it can normalise sex/ gender as something that just is. Certainly, the equality 
governance sector addressed, and continues to address, structures of disadvantage, attending to 
gender’s institutional features, from stereotyping in schools to the criminal justice system’s 
response to sexual violence, to care-work norms and practices. However, the processes through 
which subjectivities become gendered (and, some would argue, sexed), the attachments and 
investments that form part of these processes, and the recognition of gendering as a social 
process, are rarely explicitly addressed.  
A subject-first approach coincides with a liberal understanding of gender in which 
people’s right to a (recognised) gender, and public treatment of gender as something of value, 
supersede more critical forms of political engagement. This creates problems for those feminist 
accounts which seek to question gender itself – not just the unequal allocations of goods that 
gender differentiations have historically been tied to. But should public bodies participate in this 
endeavour; and if so, how? Given their institutional power and authority, participating in projects 
which challenge people’s self-identifications on the basis that they are the ideological effects of 
damaging gendering processes, treating certain people as proxies for excessively-powerful 
statuses, or articulating political goals and new common-sense norms outside of a progressive-
liberal gender consensus can seem fraught. One striking refrain from our interviews was a felt 
public responsibility to be careful and proportionate, to mediate, build bridges, and be inclusive, 
a responsibility that interviewees characterised as expected of bodies, such as local councils, 
when engaged in equality governance. One equality officer told us,  







“I would not write a speech or kind of draft a note for my [chair] … that might have a… 
highly strident and polarising framing. … I think it’s just being sensitive that you can meet 
your legal duties and promote all the values that I have mentioned in a way that tries to 
bring people along with you and not alienate certain aspects of communities 
unnecessarily.” 
Another remarked, 
“Some people will say to us, well, there is a theatre called [], they’ve got gender-neutral 
toilets, why don't we have? We are not a theatre; we have to cater for the whole 
community. We are a council. We do have to – we have to strike a balance. We don't want 
to just sort of pander to the most conservative, but at the same time, we are serving the 
whole community.” 
Yet, public bodies are not unitary formations, with a single ethos or approach; and treating them 
as singularities can miss the diverse (and sometimes divergent) agendas, activities, and norms of 
their parts (see also Cooper 2016; 2019b: ch. 3). These parts include procedures, spaces, and 
objects; they also include human subjects. Public bodies exercise responsibility for unmaking 
and remaking gender through the actions of their staff, clients, politicians, partners, and others. 
While these are sometimes undertaken explicitly in the organisation’s name, street-level actions 
and other micro-decisions can also involve informal organisational practices. Here, actions may 
exceed what was formally intended or anticipated as human parts of public bodies pursue 
progressive gender norms, including norms that go beyond the official discourse of removing 
barriers, equalising opportunity, recognising group-based needs, or supporting individual rights. 
Indeed, it may be in these seemingly less powerful, less official actions that gender’s structures 
can get named and confronted – at least symbolically.  In my final discussion, I explore this 
process by considering one micro-scene of gender-based responsibility. Given the minor (even 
trivial) status of this scene, I should stress that it has not been chosen for its importance to 
gender’s unmaking or remaking. Rather, its utility lies in the informal organisational power it 
tracks, its invocation of the intractability – but also the pull – of symbolic dilemmas, and in how 
it exposes the complications generated by soft decertification and attendant moves to privatise 
gender.  






It concerns an episode in which a small group of organisational members were selected to 
fulfil a brief task: to interview someone for a job. Together, they had to decide how to act. 
Taking responsibility for gender’s unmaking or remaking can sometimes seem straight-forward – 
policies and action that respond to explicitly biased rules or stereotypical norms, for instance. 
But this was not the case here. Instead, what seems, at first glance, an easy decision becomes 
increasingly complicated and uncertain. Tracing the decision, and the gendered subjects on 
whom it rests, also brings a wider constellation of action into view. Here, the dramaturgical 
language of “scenes” is helpful – not just as an interpretive frame, but as a concept that folds in 
particular forms of actualisation as well as imagining, including in ways that centre and decentre 
“the decision”.  
 
Using informal organisational resources to take responsibility for gender 
Taking responsibility for gender, as I have explored, can involve new policies, initiatives, and 
rules that seek to revise one room or corner in gender’s institutional house. But responsibility can 
also operate in less tangible ways – to involve, instead, a movement into a relationship of 
attention and social proximity as Pat Noxolo and colleagues discuss (2012), drawing on Gayatri 
Spivak’s (2008) work.  This movement into attention became evident in this episode, where an 
attempt to symbolically resist gender’s unequal normative alignments momentarily redirected an 
organisational “scene”,  away from what it was “supposed” to be doing.20 It concerns an 
interview panel with three women and one man (or so it seemed), drawn from different parts of a 
large organisation. Political and social theory typically equates the public domain of strangers 
and citizens with spaces and discourses outside of work (as well as outside of the home). Yet, in 
contemporary post-industrial states, large workplaces often provide the sites where public 
relations of citizenship, acquaintance, and stranger-interaction take place as people who do not 
know each other (or at least not well) gather to perform a task. In the scene here, sifting through 
preliminary decisions before the candidate’s arrival, the question arose of who should chair. As 
                                                          
20 My discussion of a “scene” is influenced by different currents of work on the dramaturgical dimensions of social 
and political practice. However, in contrast to some work, I do not rely on a division between performers and 
audience or treat a scene as necessarily invoking a powerful narrative or drama; for further discussion, see 
Alexander (2017). 







mentioned at the outset, this is a fictionalised account loosely based on something that took 
place; so, let us imagine the boardroom table around which the four people sit, and one of them 
suggests that a woman should chair. The others look uncomfortable and indicate their surprise 
that such a suggestion has been made. But why? Is it too intrusive and assuming, claiming 
something about those who are present that should remain unsaid? Or is it that the proposal is too 
mechanistic: too simple and unsubtle for the complex relations of inequality at stake? What 
might taking responsibility for gender here entail?  
Elsewhere in this Special Issue, Robyn Emerton and I explore a scaled-up version of the 
issues this scene poses. Prioritising women on parliamentary shortlists and other forms of 
positive action – with their consequential need to “determine” what people “really are” (see also 
Bailey 2008) – is often undertaken to change who or what is represented, who does the 
representing, and the style that representation takes. In the context of an appointment or job 
interview, it might be supposed that a woman chair would make women candidates feel more at 
ease and better understood; that it might shift the style of the interview, the questions asked, and 
deliberations on candidate performance afterwards; and that it might give a woman a welcome 
opportunity to chair. But while the last may be empirically true, the material benefits for users 
and recipients from having women in positions of authority, including political authority, is far 
from clear (see Childs and Krook 2009; Childs and Lovenduski 2013). Thus, I want to focus 
instead on the cultural norms conveyed, where having a woman chair is intended to counter (or 
at least to avoid reinforcing) gendered assumptions about what authority looks like (see also 
Chappell and Waylen 2013; Connell 1987). The association of authority with masculinity has 
long been something feminism has sought to counter. But suggesting a woman should chair an 
interview panel to avoid the “image” of a man commanding proceedings, flanked by three 
women, is also not a straight-forward proposition.  
One obvious and important complication is that gender is unlikely to be the only 
inequality, sutured to authority, at stake. If the decision is to help undo or refrain from reiterating 
normative codings of authority and power, then economic, racialised, dis/ability-based, 
sexualised, national and other social relations may also need to be considered in any pursuit of 
“representational justice” (see Madhok, this issue). But does addressing these different relations 






depend on naming and identifying those who are present? How straightforward is this? In the 
case of gender, some of those present may identify with genders other than male or female or 
with no gender at all. We may think there is a man and three women, but this may be wrong. 
Transgender people may be wrongly identified, but others may be also (see Watson 2016).21 The 
current momentum to privatise gender also may make it inappropriate to declare what other 
people are, assuming and asserting something that is for them, and only for them, to disclose if 
they want to. In a sense, the interview panel grouping might be construed as one of strangers 
where people, in Richard Sennett’s (1992: 63) terms, become “question marks to each other”. 
While people routinely make assumptions about each other’s gender, what acting-as-strangers 
suggests is that these assumptions are increasingly unreliable, difficult, and imperialising. In 
other words, gendered readings of others may be faulty in the sense of not corresponding with a 
person’s own self-identification. They may seem impossible where a person’s gender is 
unreadable or unplaceable within conventional categories. And ethically and morally, gender-
based assumptions may be received as improperly intrusive or simply as being in “bad taste”.  
Then, there are other dilemmas. The argument that a woman should chair to avoid 
reinforcing the socio-cultural association of authority with masculinity may seem to prefigure 
gender – representing it as if it were otherwise; but this may be at the expense of a more 
authentic account of what the gendered hierarchy is really like. Let us imagine that the man on 
the panel is more senior; does having a woman chair create a false or misleading optics? Should 
hierarchical inequalities be presented as they really are? Neoliberal tendencies to make things 
look good to mask or sanitise far more distasteful realities has generated much scathing 
comment.22 But in the context discussed here, does a critique of masking and dissembling too 
quickly dismiss the performative work done by how things appear? This suggests that it may not 
be essential for the person who seems to be a man to identify as one, or for the person read by 
                                                          
21 One municipal space where the risk of misreading people’s gender identities has arisen is in sports and leisure 
centres. A council officer told us, “We are asking people not to try and second guess a gender when they come in. If 
somebody comes and says: where are the changing rooms? Instead of immediately going, the female [changing 
room is] over there… to say: we have got a male changing there, a female changing there. There is an accessible 
changing room there and allowing them to make that choice. It’s about trying not to question people as they come 
in. And trying not to put them in that awkward situation.”  
22 Clothing companies’ use of cosmopolitan advertising visuals to present themselves as promoters of cultural 
diversity, while exploiting low paid workers in the South, has rightly been critiqued (e.g., Hennessy 2013). 







other panel members as a woman to identify as a woman all the time. Personal gender 
attachments are not being asked for, assumed, or disclosed. What matters is what the scene is 
doing through its different parts – including human parts, not necessarily who (in a personal 
sense) is doing it. This also means that what the scene is doing will exceed what is intended, that 
it is interactively and collectively forged, heterogeneous (even multiple), and that it will be 
understood in diverse ways.  
Scenes do different things, and responsibility can face in different directions. It can 
represent what could be, including in prefigurative registers which treat this “could be” as if it is 
what “is” (see also Cooper 2020). Scenes can also represent what is critically – presenting power 
relations in their starkest polarity; and scenes can represent and enact dissention and change. 
Scenes also involve action beyond what “appears”. I started with the optics in the decision of 
who should chair, but these optics (whether prefigurative or critical) may be complemented or 
complicated by what is said – as utterances reinforce, undermine or cut across what seems to be 
taking place,23 for instance, the woman chair who repeatedly defers to a male panel member or 
makes sexist comments to interviewees.24 In other cases, utterances may self-consciously mark a 
critical awareness of an inequality that, it is feared, will be reproduced by the optics of what 
appears. The verbal/written apology that is sometimes given for poor-appearing optics is one 
instance of this – why all the speakers at an event, for example, are men or white – an apology 
that rarely goes down well even as the reactions it encounters and provokes form a significant 
part of the scene (see also Ahmed 2005).25 Exercising responsibility for gender can also take up 
other senses and movements. Scenes of apology may involve gestures and action, such as people 
exiting in disgust. In other contexts, the optics of a senior man chairing an interview panel might 
be momentarily undercut by an avuncular pat as a woman lays her hand on his shoulder; or 
                                                          
23 The recent linguistic turn to “uterus” or “penis-havers” to counter the assumption that bodily characteristics align 
with sex demonstrates some current lines of contestation in the gendered politics of what is uttered; see Cooper and 
Emerton (this issue) for further discussion. 
24 This is a point which others have made in relation to the tensions between women’s descriptive and substantive 
representation; e.g., see Phillips (1995). 
25 For a helpful discussion on the non/ performativity of expressions of commitment to antiracism, see Ahmed 
(2012). Political theory often focuses on what is visible, and what is said (and heard) – using idioms of speech, 
sound and vision that sit uncomfortably with feminist and critical disability politics. Jacques Rancière’s work in 
political theory exemplifies this tendency. 






troubled by the lingering odour of stress, indicative of (or narratable as) tension – perhaps a row 
– prior to the job applicant’s appearance in the room.   
I have flagged gender’s institutional dimensions, in this essay, to foreground patterned 
relations, practices and norms that cannot be reduced to “my reproductive body” or “who I feel I 
am”. One limitation of contemporary discourses on gender is the emphasis placed on personal 
identity or sex-based subjecthood at the expense of socially formative gendering processes, 
including what gender might become. Yet, focusing on who chairs an interview panel, as the 
target for responsibility’s exercise, may similarly seem to re-inscribe gender back onto subjects. 
It may not be the gender the person self-identifies as having; however, the analysis so far 
suggests that gendered scenes are made up of and delimited by the apparent (that is, legible) 
genders of those taking part. But scenes are not containers and magnifiers of human action alone. 
We can therefore think of the scene itself as making (and so, as also remaking and unmaking) 
gender through its objects, tempo, powers, constraints, spacing, bodies, talk, and other parts. As 
non-unitary arrangements, scenes can also carry and convey a range of political projects and 
registers, including ones that collide. A scene, for instance, may bear arguments in favour of sex-
based rights, meeting arguments in favour of self-determination; and both may meet arguments 
in favour of a more structural approach to how gender operates. These arguments, importantly, 
do not only exist as utterances. Scenes also enact claims through a range of material and practical 
actions. As such, we might think about people taking responsibility, collectively, for the 
multiplex character of what the scene is making and doing, rather than just for their own actions 
or for the decision that is taken – two conventional registers of accountability.  
Decisions are often important. Even micro-scaled ones, such as the question of who 
should chair, can draw people in. Their oftentimes sticky, sometimes seductive, force holds 
participants in a relationship to the limited options available (with its risk of normalising or 
giving force to those limits). Yet, as material and symbolic processes, decisions can also be 
granted too much weight. Different literatures in political theory and policy studies have 
questioned the stress placed on the decision, demonstrating also how decisions can be thwarted, 
ineffectual, trumped, ignored, and unpredictable in their consequences (e.g., Mackay 2014). 
Discussion of responsibility can contribute to an imperial imaginary of the decision since 







responsibility is deemed to be exercised in and through the choices and determinations made. 
But responsibility can be approached in more polycentric ways. 
Taking responsibility for the scene also means taking responsibility for what is excluded 
from it, for its effects, and for the histories that have bequeathed it a particular shape, as Madhok 
points out (this issue). This is not necessarily a responsibility that imposes a practical duty to act, 
for this might prove impossible or ineffectual where the capacity to make a difference does not 
lie within the scene. Even within the limited range of decisions that a scene constitutes as 
makeable, a correct response may prove impossible as the interview chairing decision reveals. 
Here all options remain unsatisfactory since none can fully address the complex and divergent 
factors which they present themselves as a response to. Gendered inequalities, authority’s 
alignment with masculinity, and the other relations of inequality at play, cannot be meaningfully 
undone or remedied by making a choice about who should chair. Thus, we might approach 
responsibility instead, here, as a responsibility to enter into a relationship of attention, to notice, 
to care, and to exercise care. In organisational contexts, this may mean marking and drawing 
close those institutional processes that are routinely or officially constituted as too remote or 
commonplace to demand attention. In this way, micro-scenes, such as the one discussed, can 
temporarily adjust or put in motion a reordering in organisational geometries of concern. 
 
Conclusion 
This essay has adopted a broad conception of gender’s public life to argue for its recentring 
within gender politics against the contemporary tendency to approach gender as an intimate 
property of the self.26 This public recentring is not because individuals’ experiences of gender 
are unimportant – in fact, the reverse. To the extent that gender’s harms come from its 
institutionalised norms, power, and asymmetric effects, relegating gender to personal 
                                                          
26 For a contrasting depiction of gender’s association with property in this conflict, see Kay Green, “Time for 
socialists to take action against gender stereotyping”, Morning Star 17 October 2019: 
https://morningstaronline.co.uk/article/f/time-socialists-take-action-against-gender-stereotyping; last accessed 17 
August 2020. She writes, when “organisations like Stonewall, Pride and LGBT Labour march into the heart of 
women’s territory, and declare it the property of others… even those who don’t object, but wish to negotiate the 
terms of the takeover – are called ‘anti-trans’” (italics added).  






characteristic obscures its complex social character and force. It suggests already-gendered 
individuals meet a wider world that recognises or thwarts who they are. This ignores how gender 
is both made and making, that produces as well as restricts, as gendered social worlds shape, 
stimulate and redirect the formation of personhood, in the process rendering “the self” 
intelligible in hegemonic and, sometimes, counter-hegemonic ways. Gender has a life that is not 
satisfactorily captured by either individual identification or natal sex; and it is this life, in its 
myriad settings – or rather as a life that takes shape through, and from, the myriad settings which 
help compose it, from schools and workplaces to gyms and prisons – that remains important.  
Today, progressive views on gender diverge along several lines. They diverge in whether 
gender should be undone or equalised; whether others’ gender expressions should be treated as 
sites of personal autonomy and self-making or as sites of political critique; and on whether the 
primary gendered divisions to be critically undone (or remedied) follow lines of sex or gender 
transitioning status. Yet, to the extent that gender is recognised as involving asymmetrically 
patterned differences, questions of responsibility for countering these myriad differences and 
their effects remain. How responsibility is done will vary with the bodies involved. Grass-roots 
groups may address systemic relations and structures that public bodies pursuing progressive-
liberal gender agendas may steer clear of, foregrounding instead the (self)identified needs of 
gendered groups and individuals. But public bodies do not act as unitary entities (or at least not 
only as unitary entities). To the extent that their composition includes human agency, actors may 
use the informal authority and power they possess to counter regressive gender alignments, as 
my final discussion explored.  
In this case, responsibility invokes the surplus capacity and power of organisational 
subjects who can do more than is required – who can use the spaces, opportunities, resources, 
and authority of their role for not anticipated (or more than intended) ends. While literature on 
street-level discretion typically focuses on practical acts of micro-responsibility, organisational 
discretion can also be used symbolically to counter structures of power.27 Responsibility here 
                                                          
27 One controversial micro-drama I researched in the 1990s concerned a London primary head teacher, Jane Brown, 
who turned down subsidised tickets to take her pupils to the ballet Romeo and Juliet claiming, to the promoter, that 
among other reasons the play could be described as “heterosexist” (see Cooper 1998: ch. 5). While Jane Brown 







may be less about making the right decision, in contexts where this proves impossible (or 
unknowable), and more about a readiness to bear some of the weight of being attentive and to 
where this may lead. As one council officer told us, worried about the danger of gender being 
forgotten, “the challenge is of keeping gender on the agenda…when we've got so many other 
things to consider.” Yet, in pursuing responsibility, moments of non-responsibility, playful forms 
of irresponsibility, and the refusal to always be attentive, are also important to consider (see 
Munro, this issue). Public bodies may sometimes seek to close-down scenes of contested or 
unofficial responsibility-taking on grounds of illegality, impropriety or because they distract 
attention from “more important things”. But progressives may also consciously take a break from 
their assumed responsibility to remake or unmake gender for reasons of self-care, play, to gain 
critical distance, or to take care of other stuff (e.g., see Halley 2008).  
Running through this essay has been the question: what responsibility is gender due? The 
growing momentum for self-determination suggests gender is due respect, recognition, and at 
times the state’s classificatory withdrawal. While recognising the sharp concerns that underpin 
this formulation, this essay has taken a different approach: to explore the critical attention that 
remains important since gender’s shape is a social shape that exceeds its conventional human 
outline and contours. Critical attention towards gender on account of its asymmetrical 
institutional force is a well-established aspect of feminist analysis. The question this essay has 
posed and traced through two sites where the challenge of soft decertification has surfaced is: 
what does critical attention mean; and how can responsibility be taken to unmake or remake 
gender in conditions where gender is also claimed as personal, even private, and so unmoored 
from the limits and restrictions of an imposed binary structure?   
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